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Abstract
This paper proposes an architecture and a protocol suite for a permissioned blockchain
for a local IoT network. The architecture is based on a sealed Sequencer and a Fog Server
running Guy Fawkes protocols. The blockchain is stored in networked Content Addressable
Storage alongside any user data and validity proofs. We maintain that an IoT device can,
within its resource limitations, use our blockchain directly, without a trusted intermediary.
This includes posting and monitoring transactions as well as blockchainsupported emergency
communications.
1 Introduction
This article presents a Block Chain construction based on the well-known Guy Fawkes Protocol
(GFP) [2] for digital signature, which we extend and bring to bear on Block Chain (BC) technology
intended for a swarm of low-power devices (IoT things). The primary purpose of this blockchain
is to support an immutable distributed ledger that ensures the authenticity and sequencing of user
records posted on it. Financial transactions for IoT are not our intention, but they should be
compatible with our approach.
We set ourselves the following design constraints on behalf of the participating things:
1. Post Quantum restriction, in particular no public key crypto
2. low computational power. Notice that the avoidance of public key crypto is synergetic with
this constraint
3. low local storage. A thing may have a flash card embedded in it, but the use of the flash card
requires eats into the energy budget
4. local communication. At least part of the protocol should be conducted via UHF broadcasts
over the target area. An effective adversary should have to radiate significant power (reliably
over the legal limit) and expose itself to triangulation
5. it must be possible for all things to authenticate the distributed ledger under realistic assump-
tions without relying on a trusted intermediary
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Those are the main objectives. There are secondary ones as well, but we will introduce them when
and as necessary. We believe the main security risk with our scheme to be the Denial of Service
(DoS) attack. Due to the use of local communications (constraint 4 above), DoS attacks only need
to be impeded but not totally suppressed. The latter is impossible due to the possibility of an
attacker’s physically jamming the communication infrastructure.
Section 2 introduces the protocol idea. Section 3 defines the system architecture. The protocol for
posting content on the blockchain is presented and discussed in Section 4. In the subsequent section,
Section 5, we show how a user can be enrolled on the chain at a point other than the beginning. The
next section puts forward a solution for emergency communications, when the originator cannot
wait for the next block of the blockchain to be published. Section 7 cites some related work and
finally there are conclusions.
2 Protocol Idea
The Guy Fawkes Protocol family was first proposed by a Cambridge group [2] 10 years ahead
of Nakamoto. The original formulation is very clear and can be practically useful, but it was
not specifically intended as a block chain protocol. We will now introduce a similar construction
optimised for this purpose.
Goal. Assume that a single transmitter is to broadcast a stream of public, authenticated messages
to an unspecified number of receivers. The following conditions must be satisfied:
1. It should be possible (ideally at low cost) for each receiver to prove that the message was sent
by the transmitter without trusting any intermediary.
2. It should be cryptographically hard for an attacker to modify any message or to change the
order of messages without the receivers noticing
3. The broadcaster should be able to send an unlimited number of messages without weakening
the security of the previous two constraints.
(We will also observe the Post Quantum restriction here: no DH, no public key crypto.)
Threat model.
i An attacker can force one or more receivers to receive the attacker’s arbitrary message instead of
the one being transmitted by the transmitter, or prevent a receiver from receiving the message
at all.
ii However, the attacker cannot thus disrupt all receivers and it cannot make any receiver conclude
that the broadcast did not take place. The former can be achieved by delivering at least one
copy of the broadcast message by an alternative physical channel, and the latter by broadcasting
messages on a public wall-clock schedule.
Point (ii) makes it possible for a receiver that the protocol determines has received an invalid
message to solicit unauthenticated candidate messages from peer receivers. We will show that using
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BIN Transmit/Receive Verify Obtain
1 L1 = H(N2)⊕N1
S1 = EN1(H(M1)⊕H(N2)) P1 out of band
P1 = H(N1)
2 L2 = H(N3)⊕N2
S2 = EN2(H(M2)⊕H(N3)) H(L1 ⊕ P2) = P1 H(M1) = P2 ⊕DL1⊕P2S1
P2 = H(N2)
3 L3 = H(N4)⊕N3
S3 = EN3(H(M3)⊕H(N4)) H(L2 ⊕ P3) = P2 H(M2) = P3 ⊕DL2⊕P3S2
P3 = H(N3)
... ... ... ...
k Lk = H(Nk+1)⊕Nk
Sk = ENk(H(Mk)⊕H(Nk+1)) H(Lk−1 ⊕ Pk) = Pk−1 H(Mk−1) = Pk ⊕DLk−1⊕PkSk−1
Pk = H(Nk)
Figure 1: PLS Protocol
the protocol each receiver will be able to select the genuine message out of a set of candidates. This
makes threat (i) a DoS threat rather than a data-integrity one.
Now to the protocol. It uses a standard cryptographic hash H(x) (e.g. SHA-256) and assumes that
it is sufficiently hard to find a pre-image x given its hash H(x). In fact so hard that it is impossible
to find x within the time between the signing of two consecutive messages. All values except the
messages themselves Mk are binary strings of the same length as H. Additionally the protocol uses
symmetric encryption Eq(p) which encrypts plaintext p under the key q producing a ciphertext,
and its dual decryption: Dq(Eq(p)) = p. This could be any standard cipher, e.g. AES128, suitably
adapted to the key and text size using one of the standard methods.
The protocol operates in steps according to the wall-clock time. All receivers and the transmitter
synchronise their clocks so that when the transmitter’s clock registers a time tT , any receiver’s clock
tR is no more than  away:
|tT − tR| <  .
The transmitter broadcasts at regular intervals, t0, t0 + τ, t0 + 2τ, . . ., where τ  . Each broadcast
consists of three messages of a fixed size, P , L and S; they are a proof, link and signature message,
respectively. It is convenient to think of them as being broadcast on three different channels, or in
three different time slots, or with a tag that tells the receiver which message it is. The messages are
not explicitly indexed, but it is convenient to think of them as being indexed with the Broadcast
Interval Number (BIN): BIN 0 corresponds to the interval [t0 + , t0 + τ − ], BIN 1 to the interval
[t0 + τ + , t0 + 2τ − ], etc. Note that the P , L and S broadcasts in the same interval are not
mutually ordered.
Now to the calculations, figure 1. In or before the first interval, receivers obtain independent
3
authentication of P1. In each interval k the transmitter creates a fresh random nonce, Nk+1, and
keeps it secret until the end of the next interval k + 1. One such nonce, N1, is created by the
transmitter before launching the protocol.
The protocol is a two-stage pipeline. At BIN=1, the transmitter sends out the link, signature and
proof messages, saves N2 and keeps it secret till the end of the next interval. The receiver receives
and saves the received messages. It uses the remaining time in the interval to poll its peers to
learn any alternative values of L, S, and P should they be received (which may be due to signal
propagation problems, deliberate jamming or a cyber attack).
At BIN=2, the receiver receives P2 and verifies that for some candidate L1 and P2, H(L1⊕P2) = P1.
It means that these values of L1 and P2 are genuine. Indeed, an attacker wishing to convince the
receiver that an alternative link message
Lˆ1 = H(Nˆ2)⊕N1 6= L1
is genuine in order to make a forged signature for its own message Mˆ1
Sˆ1 = EN1(H(Mˆ1)⊕H(Nˆ2))
would have to have sent these messages at BIN=1, when only the transmitter knows the value of
N2, so the attacker would have to use its own nonce, Nˆ2 6= N2, and then force the receiver to receive
Pˆ2 = H(Nˆ2). To succeed at that, the attacker must be able to obtain N1 within interval 1, to use
it in the Lˆ1 message. But all that is publicly known about N1 then is its hash, H(N1) = P1.
That is the linchpin of the security of any Guy Fawkes protocol, our version or the classic[2] alike.
The attacker has to find a pre-image of a public hash value in order to mount a successful attack.
The chances of finding a pre-image are slim, 2−l; for l = 256 the attacker would have to do around
1077 hash calculations to find the pre-image on a classical computer. This can be improved upon
by quantum computing, reducing the number to 2−l/2 ≈ 1038, still reliably unfeasible and certainly
good enough for the realm of the IoT.
Leaving the DoS scenario aside, we assume that the receivers succeed. Next the receiver uses the
formula in the last column of the table in figure 1 to calculate H(M1) on all candidate S-messages
recorded at BIN=1. All these values are considered equally valid, but only one of them, namely
the genuine value of H(M1), where M1 is a message known to the transmitter at BIN=1, can ever
be used. An attacker corrupting message S1 can only achieve denial of service: to fit a message to
an arbitrary hash value of it (for example, by extending the message with a non-data-bearing tail)
is computationally as difficult as it is to fit N1 to a known H(N1).
The reader may wonder about the purpose of encryption. In the original Guy Fawkes protocol
only hashes are used, but at least four hash-length items need to be communicated in each signing
round, whereas PLS requires only three, a 25% saving in communication costs. Communication is
important for the IoT world, where typically the radio duty cycle of a thing is limited to a fraction of
1%. Also we argue that the computational cost of a symmetric encryption is several times cheaper
than that of a hash for at least some popular IoT platforms.
Another question is whether the public availability of H(M1) gives the attacker an alternative
method for obtaining N1 at BIN=1: by brute-forcing the encryption key. The answer is that this
would require the plaintext (the cipher text is publicly available as S1 at this point), and to obtain
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Figure 2: Architecture of a PLS-blockchain system
the plaintext the attacker needs to know H(N2) = P2, which is not revealed at BIN=1. To obtain
H(N2) from the public value of L1, the attacker requires the value of N1 which is what the attacker
is trying to fit.
At the end of interval 2 the receiver will have received, and collected from peers all alternative
versions of, L2 and S2 and is now prepared for the next, third interval, etc. The protocol is run
periodically as long as the transmitter stays in commission. Since any secrets have a short lifetime 2τ
after which they are published rather than merely not used, there is no accumulation of confidential
material at the transmitter site; consequently the transmitter has no security motivated expiration
time.
3 System architecture
The PLS protocol described above is well suited to serve as a basis for a blockchain system. The
key property that makes it so suitable is provable, time-referenced forward chaining, the fact that
L-messages establish a cryptographically protected, unsplittable temporal chain of {Mi}, with each
Mi being defined by its hash H(Mi). With the head of the chain independently authenticated
for all actors before the protocol launch, the set of link/proof pairs and the hardness of the hash
pre-image problem guarantee that the chain can be validated in isolation by any observer who is
present and able to receive messages at broadcast times. No additional source of trust is required
to validate the chain although a trusted third party may well be useful as defence against a DoS
attack, bearing in mind that light touch security would be sufficient for that purpose.
We propose an architecture of an IoT system with blockchain services, see fig 2.
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Sequencer. At the core of it is placed a physically secure, firmware based, multi-radio connected
blockchain Sequencer. The job of the Sequencer is, as the name suggests, building the sequence
of chained blocks. The blocks themselves are prepared for the Sequencer by the Fog Server (see
below). The Fog Server communicates with the Sequencer in one way (transmits), over a separate
authenticated radio channel (Bluetooth, for example), the details of which are private to them.
What differentiates the Sequencer from the Fog Server is the fact that the Sequencer is not connected
to any general purpose networks. Its security role is to run an active PLS protocol on schedule and
to keep each nonce Nk confidential until the next broadcast period. The Sequencer’s embodiment
as a separate air-gapped unit with enhanced physical security serves only one purpose: prevention
of a blockchain split, which is effective if and only if the confidentiality of Nk over a short period
of time can be assured. Split avoidance is important for defeating DoS attacks, but the validity of
the blocks is not in jeopardy due to the second aspect of the Sequencer, namely the fact that it
performs a radio broadcast using a wall-clock synchronised, long-distance signal. As a result, if the
defences fail and an attacker compromises the Sequencer, the only non-DoS way to profit from this
is to have different broadcasts directed to different groups of things. In this case the inconsistencies
will eventually be detected by radio monitoring, but it could be too late, especially if things perform
critical work, hence the importance of air-gapping and physical protection for the Sequencer.
CAS. For the purposes of sequencing and signing we are going to use the PLS protocol (and a
similar SLVP protocol for things, see section 4), but what is going to be sequenced and signed are
in fact the hashes of the actual messages. To store messages and retrieve them at a user’s request,
we place a Content-Addressable Storage (CAS) unit on a local TCP/IP subnet and organise
a private channel (behind the organisation’s firewall) between the unit and the Fog Server. CAS
operates in WORM mode: a file is stored once under the hash of its content as its file name, which
means that it cannot be changed without the file name changing, that it is easy to verify that
it hasn’t been changed and that no trust between a user and the CAS is required. Due to the
irreversible nature of hashing, it is prohibitively expensive to extend a different content with some
chosen data to store it under the same hash, so all the content-recipient needs to do to ascertain
the integrity of the content is check that its hash is correct.
Every time a new block is formed to go on the block chain, the block content is stored in CAS and
the hash of it is used in the protocol. All things have access to CAS and can retrieve a file when
the hash of its content is known.
Fog Server. Blockchain-powered systems should be careful not to overclaim the attractive se-
curity properties of blockchain technology, especially when this concerns private blockchains for
IoT. An IoT system’s security cannot be completely decentralised since, ultimately, the network
of things is owned by an organisation, and that organisation should have authority to add and
remove things, configure them, assign jobs to them, etc. at any time and without waiting for the
slow validation process characteristic of most blockchains. This does not necessarily mean that
everything should be centralised; in fact very little centralisation is required mainly the issues of
reconfiguration (adding/removing) and conflict resolution (proof service) as well as possibly running
smart contracts on the blockchain.
The presence of the infrastructure above the IoT can be captured by introducing into our architec-
ture an actor that we call the Fog Server (FS), which is a local datacenter that has direct connection
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to things via a suitable radio network (e.g. LoRa), as well as a sufficient compute power, storage
and connection to Cloud. The actors should trust the FS for:
• enrolment of new things to the block chain, and their removal. At the point of enrolment, the
Cloud supplies to the FS confidential identity material for the new thing which allows the FS
to establish initial credentials of the thing on the blockchain. It also shares with the thing a
symmetric key. Also note that a modern IoT device is equipped with hardware encryption
facilities and can hold the key in software-unreadable, immutable persistent memory inside
its Hardware Security Module (HSM).
• as part of the previous, supplying to a thing that joins the blockchain late the authenticated
hash of the relevant blockchain history.
• withdrawal of a thing from the blockchain.
The FS is the actor that forms blocks for the blockchain by gathering and validating SLVP protocol
messages (see section 4) from things and outside agents (via Cloud) and collecting them into blocks.
No trust is required for this, since the FS processes messages received from things and agents on
the basis of the blockchain content, which is public and shared by all things. Any violation of
the validation rules will be noticed by the parties affected and any well equipped witness, i.e. a
(possibly non-enrolled) radio listening post, will be in a position to collect a protocol proof of illegal
behaviour, which can be logged and used for intrusion detection.
What cannot be protected 100% reliably by our methods is progress. It is possible in principle
for the FS to deny service by refusing to react to valid, legitimate messages sent by things, or by
maliciously modifying the content of those messages, if the FS is compromised. However, server
protection is not an issue of IoT security, but a general cybersecurity concern, which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Before launch the the Sequencer creates and shares with the FS (on the authenticated side channel)
P1 for the PLS protocol.
Proxies. This is yet another zero-trust agent. It has two functions:
1. Amplify the Sequencer’s radio broadcasts (by constructive interference, if LoRa communica-
tions are used, or by re-broadcasting broadcast messages). The Fog FS is the source of blocks
for the block chain and all Proxies are sent the next broadcast message by the Sequencer via
the FS just before they are due to be broadcast.
2. Pick up messages from things directed to the blockchain. This is useful because direct con-
nection to the FS over the air may not be possible given a low power budget and compromise
antennae that things have to work with. A Proxy is connected to the intranet and can forward
messages to the server and CAS. The blockchain protocol which we will consider in the next
section is robust: Proxies can forward messages of unclear origin and authority; at best they
will be filtered out by the FS, at worst they will find their way to the blockchain but will not
be properly signed by a legitimate actor and hence will have no effect other than the waste
of resources.
All Proxies are connected to a subnet of the local intranet, which facilitates function 1 above as
the FS is able to multicast on the subnet rather than notify each proxy separately. If the intranet
7
is adequately protected, no further protocol support is necessary; if not, the FS should open a
dedicated PLS sequence with the Proxies (by authenticating yet another P1 out of band or on the
blockchain) to enable the FS to sign and order the Sequencer’s broadcasts as it relays them to the
Proxies’ subnet.
Communications. The reader will have noticed that the proposed architecture uses the combi-
nation of a dedicated radio channel for security-related data and a general-purpose communication
infrastructure, whether wired or wireless, on which things may establish an auxiliary channel. This
is a deliberate choice for the following reasons.
The purpose of the dedicated radio channel is to ensure by physical means the reliability of broad-
cast. The only credible threat to the PLS protocol is a DoS attack whereby one or more users
of the network cannot get uncorrupted P, L or S messages from the Sequencer. The architecture
enables a volume transmission of these messages, with the Sequencer radiating them at maximum
legal power and the Proxies joining in by concurrent transmission. We propose that the security
radio channel is implemented via LoRa[1], a Long Range spread-spectrum technology with many
remarkable properties.
We exploit the fact that as a spread spectrum format, LoRa benefits from concurrent transmissions,
where two or more signals carrying the same content in the same modulation regime can be broad-
cast simultaneously from different locations. Any receiver for whom the signal of one transmitter
exceeds the rest only by a factor of 2 (3dB) will not sense the others ([13] p.21436, under “Capture
Effect”, [17]). This is due to the Frequency Modulated (chirp) nature of LoRa, and is well known
as the capture effect in both communication and FM broadcast industry [12].
The idea is to endow the Proxies with maximum legal power transmission facilities and to place
them in such a way that the communication range of each Proxy captures a certain structural
unit on the premises, e.g. a floor (or a building if it is small enough), to form a communication
locus. Different loci are separated by distances (as in the case of loci as individual buildings) or
obstacles (e.g. construction elements supporting a floor if the loci belong to different floors). This is
confirmed by [13] (see p.21443 under “The Robustness of CT-LoRa”). The distance is by itself quite
an effective dampener, as radio signals fade by 6db when the distance between the transmitter and
the receiver is doubled, which would ensure a more than sufficient power contrast for the capture
effect.
If properly deployed, the proposed architecture ensures that an attacker can only deny LoRa com-
munications to an IoT node by radiating power exceeding legal limits and using a directional
antenna, or by installing additional equipment on the premises by breaking physical security. In
both cases a large proportion of the IoT devices will remain unaffected by the attack. They will
be able to collect all versions of the security messages (including genuine ones and those coming
from the attacker) and exchange them between each other using unprotected network. Security
protocols will then quickly establish which versions are genuine.
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Block Transmit Verification BC Action
i0 P1 = H(N1) Out of Band (Enrolment)
i1 S1 = EN1(H(M1)⊕H(N2))
i2 L1||V1 = H(N2)⊕N1 ||H(H(N2)||N1)
... ... ... ...
in Pk = H(Nk) ... post Pk
in+1 Sk = ENk(H(Mk)⊕H(Nk+1))
in+2 Lk||Vk = H(Nk+1)⊕Nk ||H(H(Nk+1)||Nk)
in+3 Pk+1 = H(Nk+1) Fetch latest P = Pk from block B = in
Set failed=true
for LV : B < #(LV ) < in+3
if H(L⊕ Pk+1) 6= P , continue
set N = L⊕ Pk+1
if H(Pk+1||N) = V
failed=false; break
if failed, exit ignore Pk+1
for L′V ′: B < #(L′V ′) < #(LV )
if V ′ = H(L′ ⊕N ||N), exit ignore Pk+1
for all S: B < #(S) < #(LV )
determine HM = DN S ⊕ Pk+1
send to CAS: (k,UID, HM , α(LV ), α(S)) post Pk+1
exit
Figure 3: SLVP Protocol. Assume bitwise exclusive-or ⊕ to have a higher priority than concate-
nation ||. #(x) is the number of the block in which record x is located, and α(x) is its unique ID
(address). The sequence of block numbers is in strictly increasing order: i0 < i1 < i2 < ...
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4 Posting on the blockchain
It is tempting to use a similar protocol to what we have described in section 2 to enable an IoT
device to post transactions directly on the blockchain. The advantage of a Guy Fawkes type protocol
(which we will call a GF protocol for short) is that any secrets are short-lived, the calculations basic
and post-quantum, and communications modest. However the key vulnerability of such a protocol
is its inherent reliance on the precedence of events. With PLS we used wall-clock time to separate
intervals; wall-clock time with a reasonable accuracy (less than tens of seconds drift over a year)
is cheap and available to even the tiniest of IoT platforms. Much tighter synchronisation can be
achieved if necessary by using the Sequencer’s broadcast as a self-certified beacon. However, a thing
does not generally need to post a transaction on each block of the blockchain, and it is often quite
expensive for it to do so from the energy perspective. Precedence can easily be established if the
protocol publishes messages on the ledger using an ideal communication environment, where all
messages reach their destination and all can be published in the interval that they were emitted.
Which is far from reality in the IoT world.
Jam-spoof attack. With Sequencer broadcasting messages for all users without exception, hav-
ing maximum legal transmission power and being further supported by Proxies, one can guarantee
message delivery (possibly several unauthenticated versions, but that is no problem) either directly,
or via subsequent exchanges between users before the interval is out. When a thing sends its content
to the FS, the content is of no interest to the peers and the resources used for delivering it are quite
limited. If the thing posts on the chain infrequently, at unpredictable times, any GF protocol based
on imperfect communication is potentially vulnerable to the jam-spoof attack as follows:
(below T is a thing and M is an attacker)
1. T runs the protocol to the point where it is about to reveal to a verifier by messaging the so
far confidential pre-image to prove a signature (a key feature of any GF protocol)
2. M suppresses the verifier’s receiver by jamming the broadcast channel. At the same time
M uses a high-gain directional antenna and sophisticated signal reconstruction techniques
beyond the capabilities of the verifier to reliably receive the message from T . As a result M
learns the secret, but the verifier is left believing that the secret has not been revealed yet.
3. M masquerading as T proceeds to publish its link- and proof-records based on the knowledge
of the secret pre-image. The link-message will use a different next nonce than the genuine
link-message from T published on the blockchain earlier, but the same current nonce, thus
forking T ’s GF sequence. Also the knowledge of both nonces enables M to post its own
signature message on the blockchain to sign an arbitrary hash on behalf of T and to continue
to do so indefinitely.
4. T sees the split of its sequence on the blockchain and alerts the FS, but now the FS (or any
other arbitrator) is unable, based solely on the blockchain content, to determine whether it is
T or M that is the genuine originator of the latest messages.
Two remedies are available. One is to require authentication of all messages from a thing to the FS.
This immediately destroys the zero trust environment we have built, where the only aspect that all
users, including the FS itself, have to trust is the correct operation of the Sequencer, and even that
10
up to post-verification. Consequently, we desire to implement a GF protocol that does not require
additional trust and which survives a jam-spoof attack. It turns out that a small modification is
required to arrive at the following SLVP protocol, see fig 3. We will now comment on some of its
aspects.
SLVP protocol. A new blockchain user is enrolled by the FS1 by authenticating the user’s first
P-record out of band. Assume that the user sends that record to the blockchain (which means to
the FS in the first place) and it appears in some block i0
All records on the blockchain carry a UID, i.e. the User IDentification, stated by the message
originator. We propose that the user is identified by the first two bytes of its P1 record. The server
will not accept the P1 message if it determines that the first two bytes of the hash clash with an
already established user. On the other hand, 2 bytes are sufficient for an excess of 64 thousand
users, while a typical IoT swarm does not exceed2 1000. In the sequel we will not distinguish
between the UID and the user with a given UID if the context is clear in this regard.
The table in fig 3 presents the protocol from the point of view of a single UID and the FS. Other
UIDs will conduct themselves in the same way. An SLVP transmitter (an IoT device) uses specially
arranged IoT communication channels different from those used by the Sequencer. This could be
frequency-, time-division multiplexing, a combination of both or a different communication format
(e.g. LoRa, IEEE 802.15.4 or even WiFi).
Like the PLS protocol introduced earlier the SLVP protocol is invoked periodically, but now at
some arbitrary times, which in terms of the blockchain schedule correspond to block intervals. The
transmitter does not need a specific confirmation that the message has been received; it simply
checks newly formed blocks to find the record that it has transmitted. When this happens, the
transmitter sends the next message according to the protocol. If a legitimate transmitter’s correct
message is not posted on the blockchain after it has been transmitted, it either wasn’t received at
all, or it was received with an unrecoverable error, or it was impaired in the channel and no longer
matches the original message content. Under such circumstances the transmitter will re-send the
message until it is posted on the blockchain intact.
The protocol proceeds in rounds, each consisting in three steps:
S → LV → P
where S is, as before, the signature record, LV is an extended link-verify record, and P is the proof
record as before. The LV record consists of the L-record, similar to that of the PLS protocol, which
is extended with a V -record for thwarting the jam-spoof attack. Since the UID is not authenticated
and the channel generally lacks integrity, any messages directed to the blockchain can be arbitrarily
distorted or lost.
The protocol depends on things’ ability to receive blocks on the blockchain successfully via the
PLS protocol, dedicated Sequencer channels and any remedial measures that ensure that the block
hashes are received and verified before the next Sequencer period by all users engaging in SLVP.
Unlike the Sequencer engaging in timed broadcasts, an SLVP user can be quiescent for many block
1this makes it a permissioned blockchain
2There is some evidence that 1000 nodes could saturate the IoT long-range joint channel capacity [9]
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periods. The new round k starts after the user’s Pk message has been received by the FS, validated
and posted on the blockchain in some block in. Which block this is going to be depends on the
timing of the Pk message. The user, having satisfied itself that its message Pk was received and
posted under its UID, sends the S-message Sk and waits for it to get posted, too, say in block
in+1 > in. The S-message does not expose a single bit of either nonce Nk,k+1 since the value Sk
depends on yet undisclosed H(Mk) and since there does not exist an attack on the cipher E where
neither the key nor the plaintext is known. Sometimes it is convenient for the user to post more
than one S-records, for example when several documents need signature but they are not otherwise
related. The user is allowed to send as many different S-messages as is practical. For simplicity,
we will assume that one S-message is posted in round k
Having satisfied itself that the Sk has been posted on the blockchain, the user transmits its LV -
message. The link part, L is the same as that in PLS, and it serves the same purpose: its value
links the current nonce Nk with the new one, Nk+1. The verify part V is there to make sure that
an attacker who learns Nk later cannot combine it with its own Nˆk+1 and post
Lˆk = H(Nˆk+1)⊕Nk
on the blockchain. In such a case the FS would be unable to decide between Lk and Lˆk due to
the fact that Lk can be a distorted version of Lˆk, and the message Lˆk an attempt to correct the
distortion. With the V message in place, for any pair of LV -records:
Lk||Vk = H(Nk+1)⊕Nk ||H(H(Nk+1)||Nk)
and
Lˆk||Vˆk = H(Nˆk+1)⊕Nk ||H(H(Nˆk+1)||Nk) ,
where
H(Lk ⊕ Pk+1) = H(Lˆk ⊕ Pk+1) = Pk ,
the one posted in an earlier block wins: the protocol-compliant user does not disclose the genuine
Pk+1 = H(Nk+1) in the same block as Lk||Vk and so the fact that
Vk = H(Pk+1||Lk ⊕ Pk+1)
proves that the originator knew H(Nk+1) before it was posted. The only actor that knows H(Nk+1)
before it is posted is the genuine user.
The message Pk+1 is sent in some later block period in+3 to finish the current round. The FS verifies
the message and processes the round that it completes along the lines of the above argument. If
verification succeeds, the new P -record is posted. Notice that no matter how many counterfeit
LV messages have been posted by attackers since the last verified P and no matter how many
counterfeit P -records are sent after them, only one P record will be accepted and posted by the FS
in any round of the protocol. Also the FS will find only one LV -record to be valid, which is the
earliest LV -record compatible with both the previous and the newly validated P -record.
Next the FS will reverse all S-records under the user’s UID after block in by computing
HM = Pk+1 ⊕DPk+1⊕LS .
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Each record r on the blockchain has its address α(r) = (ir, lr), where ir is the block number where
r is located and lr is the sequential number of r among the records of the same type and under the
same UID in block ir.
For each record S in the current round k, the FS collects proof data in the following form:
WS = (k,UID, HM , α(LV ), α(S))
and instructs the CAS unit to store WS under H(WS) as usual. The CAS unit will use HM as a
trigger. When/if the user UID stores content c in CAS, such that H(c) = HM , the CAS manager
will post a new type of record, C-record, on the blockchain on behalf of UID:
C = UID : (HM , H(WS))
which serves as blockchain confirmation that CAS has taken charge of the content file as well as the
proof data for it for any witness to verify. Triggers that are not triggered by the user over a certain
number of blocks (large enough to conclude that the original S-message was counterfeit/distorted)
are removed from CAS and copied to the security log of the FS. A C-message will be ignored (and
the corresponding C-record not posted) if a trigger for it has not been provided by the FS at the
time of submission.
Counterfeit S-messages pose no threat. They will be deciphered to an unpredictable HM , and an
attacker would not be able to provide content that matches a given hash value anymore than it
is able to find a nonce N given H(N), the latter being the main security assumption for any GF
protocol.
5 Enrolment and optimisations
It has been mentioned earlier that the very first hash P1 of the protocols is validated out of band.
For a user to be able to start SLVP there are two requirements:
• access to the blockchain which includes out of band validation of the latest Pk and all previous
blocks from 1 to k − 1, inclusively
• registration of the user’s P1 for out of band validation.
Enrolment of new equipment normally requires a human administrator as it involves physical place-
ment, configuration and initialisation of the item according to the business objectives. We propose
the following enrolment protocol:
1. The administrator’s workstation establishes secure confidential communication with the FS
using state of the art security. The FS shares a fresh key K with the administrator.
2. The new thing that the administrator has ascertained to be genuine
i receivesK and the Sequencer’s latest Pk using near-field communications (NFC) or similar,
ii generates N1 and another random nonce N
∗
iii computes P1 = H(N1)
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iv sends Q = P1||EK(P1 ⊕N∗) back to the server via the same NFC arrangement.
3. The FS examines a short prefix of P1, pi(P1), e.g. 2 bytes, and checks that no UID with this
value has been enrolled. If that is the case, the server computes N∗ from Q and responds
with ACK = H(N∗) otherwise the response is FAIL.
4. If the response is FAIL, the thing alerts the administrator and generates a new pair N1 and
N∗ and repeats steps 2 and 3. Otherwise
i the thing verifies that ACK = H(N∗) and notes its new UID, i.e. pi(P1)
ii confirms completion to the administrator, giving the UID.
If ACK 6= H(N∗) the protocol fails; a notification to this effect quoting P1,N∗ and ACK is
sent to the administrator for subsequent analysis.
5. The administrator notifies the FS that completion was successful and if so, notes the UID in
the local database together with any intended location for the thing and any other inventory
data that may be required. If the protocol succeeds, the thing stores the key K in its Hardware
Security Module (HSM).
Now the new IoT device is ready to receive the minimum data necessary to access the blockchain.
The amount of trust required for it is exactly the same as it is for any other user: it needs to
authenticate the latest Pk, except for the devices that have been present from the start the index
k = 1. But how is it going to authenticate the blocks that were formed before block k?
We propose to communicate the Merkel minimal forest roots of the current state in each blockchain
block. The roots are a compact collection of root hashes that can be followed on CAS to securely
access any block from B1 to current stored in CAS. To illustrate the concept, let us imagine a block
sequence from block 1 (initial) to block 7 (current), see fig 4. For simplicity we use a binary Merkel
tree, in which every node is composed of the hashes of the two child nodes’ contents. Some of the
nodes are already formed and will never change (shaded in the figure), and some are still being
formed pending the future blocks. It is easy to see that the Merkel proof of any block up to and
including 7 requires only hashes of node 4321, 65, and 7 as roots, the paths of every leaf from 1 to
7 is rooted at one of them. Notice that the binary representation of 7 is 111 which corresponds to
one node each at levels 0,1 and 2. For block 5=1012 we would have a level-2 block and a level-0
block, which agrees with the diagram.
A binary Merkel tree is unjustifiably deep. Focusing on the world of the IoT, we recognise that
communications are typically limited to messages no longer than 200-250 bytes, so given a typical
hash size of 32 bytes, it is convenient to use a quad-tree, which will be much less deep. For a quad
tree in a blockchain of say, 1 mln blocks (at one block per 15 min, this gives us more than 10 years’
running), we get log4 10
6 ≈ 10, which means that the server only needs to authenticate at most 10
hashes to give a new IoT thing a secure start. For every k the record consisting of the minimal root
set
Γ(k) = (r1, ..., rp)
is computed and stored by the FS under γk = H(Γ(k)) in CAS, where k is the current block
number, and r1, . . . , rp are the Merkel tree hashes that correspond to the nonzero digits in the
base-4 representation of the number k.
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Figure 4: Merkel forest
Again, for each k, the FS will put γk at the beginning of block k + 1. Any user that wishes to
trade storage for CAS communication, or a new user who has missed an initial segment of the
block chain, but who trusts the latest Pk can use the γ-record on the block to securely retrieve any
preceding block(s) via CAS, if they choose to trust the FS. We would like to remark that the FS in
this particular case is trustworthy, since the γ record can be computed by any full witness of the
blockchain (i.e. any user that has been present since block 1) and if the FS is compromised, the
proof will be constructed instantly.
Regarding the storage requirement in CAS, they are minimal. There is no duplication due to the
very nature of CAS. Summing up the geometric series for the radix-4 Merkel tree with depth 10,
we get circa 350,000 hashes to store for 106 blocks, about 10Mb, a trivial amount of storage.
5.1 Countermeasures against DoS
The acquisition of a shared secret between the thing and the FS at the point of enrolment does not
make the blockchain any less useful. Indeed, in our threat model the FS is not trusted any more
than any other user of the blockchain, so the shared secret cannot be used to replace the security
protocols that make the blocks of the blockchain an immutable, ordered, authenticated sequence of
records. Nor is it any good for non-repudiation. However, just as the Sequencer is trusted to keep
its secret for the avoidance of blockchain split so is the FS trusted to be interested in reducing the
amount of noise on the blockchain, i.e. records sent in by an attacker on behalf of a genuine UID,
which will eventually be caught out and eliminated by the SLVP protocol. After all, as the FS is
solely responsible for what does and what does not get posted, the proposed blockchain concept
only works on the assumption that the FS itself is not and can never be behind a DoS attack. The
assumption that the FS should be a willing party to a noise-reduction protocol does not add much
to that.
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With this in mind we propose that each thing uses a very short Message Authentication Code
(MAC) based on symmetric encryption and the shared key K. The MAC need not be longer
than 2 bytes (possibly even 1 byte) and can be computed using standard techniques by the thing’s
hardware security module or crypto accelerator. The MAC is computed for each message of the
SLVP protocol sent to the server as well as the content messages sent via the FS to CAS. Due to
the shortness of the MAC, the exposure of the shared key is minimal, obviating the need for session
keys. If the MAC does not match the FS ignores the message. With a 2-byte MAC, an attacker
would have to send tens of thousands of messages to get through to the FS in the first instance;
such a volume on behalf of the single IoT user will surely raise the alarm, resulting in the intruder’s
triangulation and suppression.
Recall that the Sequencer’s messages may arrive distorted or not arrive at all, and the users,
especially things must talk to each other to collect a set of versions for each message to ensure that
the set contains the original. To facilitate this, a short authenticator can be sent by a Proxy on an
auxiliary channel to each thing in the form
u = UID, cat, pi(H(M))
where UID is its User ID, pi(H(M)) is a short hash of message M from the category cat (one of P ,
L, or S). Message u is extended with MACK(u), where K is the key agreed with UID at enrolment.
The message u is prepared by the server and is forwarded by one or more of the Proxies on the
auxiliary channel. User UID, having received u and checked the MAC, recalculates pi(H(M)) based
on the latest message in category cat received (if it did at all) and compares it with the value
contained in u. If they match, the device joins a re-broadcast concurrent-transmission group on a
pre-arranged channel (frequency and time relative to the start of the Sequencer broadcast interval)
to help nearby nodes with PLS reception. Given that PLS messages are short (not much longer
than 32 bytes if SHA-256 is used for H(·)) and infrequent (3 messages typically 2–5 times per hour,
0.5 KB/hour), a blockchain supported thing can afford to transmit as much to help other things
(which in turn will help it) to survive a DoS attack.
When it comes to the SLVP protocol, the user is the active transmitter, and the roles are reversed.
Now as a DoS resilience measure, the user UID adds a MACK(x) to every message x that it sends
to the server for posting on the blockchain. The FS checks the MAC based on the received UID and
the shared key K and if the MAC does not match, it ignores x. Again, we must stress that if the
MAC does match, this means nothing in terms of the SLVP protocol, since the FS does not trust
the thing any more than the thing trusts the FS. Reduction of noise is their common concern: the
FS acts on behalf of the owner of the IoT network and is interested in suppression of a DoS attacker,
and the thing will keep its shared K secret to avoid an attacker’s spoofing it and preventing its
legitimate messages from reaching the blockchain. Commonality of concern is the only reason why
the additional authentication will be effective.
6 Emergency mode
A distinguishing feature of IoT is its multiplicity of time scales. Most things require only infrequent
interaction with the outside world, reporting sensor readings, receiving parameter updates and
possibly code upgrades. All these activities are easily accommodated by the blockchain mechanism
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and are protected by its inherent security properties. A major downside of a blockchain is its
latency. No matter how frequently new blocks are added to the chain (and in our case they are not
even mined), a thing may discover itself in a situation when it must raise the alarm sooner than a
new block can be published, especially since in the case of GF blockchain, blocks are published on
a fixed wall-clock schedule. Even if a new block is to emerge soon, there is no guarantee that any
given thing will be able to post its message in it.
This problem is quite practical: a hospital monitor detecting a catastrophic change in a patient’s
condition, or a nuclear plant’s sensor detecting a reactor malfunctioning are cases in point.
One might think that emergency communications can be supported by using the shared key K that
the originating thing agreed at enrolment. Indeed the FS can request a full MAC and satisfy itself
that the message is authentic. However, this is not enough. Emergency communications involve
rapid response and that can only be provided if an independent arbitrator can establish that the
message was sent by no-one but the claimed originator. In other words, a signature rather than
mere authentication is required. In the absence of signature, the response agent would be running
the risk of the originator repudiating the message: after all, the symmetric key K is shared with
the FS, and so either the FS or an agent to which the FS has leaked the key (willingly or not) might
have sent the emergency message.
Non-repudiation is not a concern with blockchain communications, they cannot be repudiated for
obvious reasons. However, post hoc validation by blockchain is only useful for confirmation of valid
messages, rather than proving a message to be invalid, since the rapid response must come into
effect before blockchain validation may take place. The other way3 of ensuring non-repudiation is
by OneTime Signature (OTS), which we will consider next.
6.1 OTS
OTSs are known to have a very large “public key”, i.e. authenticated public data used for validation
of a signature. In the original OTS proposed by Lamport [11], the originator shares with the verifier
k pairs
(H(n1), H(N1)), (H(n2), H(N2)), . . . , (H(nk), H(Nk)) ,
where all ni, Ni are random nonces. To sign a k-bit message {xi}, the originator additionally
supplies k values {si}:
si =
{
ni if xi = 0
Ni otherwise
OTSs solve the problem of non-repudiation if the public key is signed and posted on the blockchain
(using SLVP as usual), but the price for an IoT device using it is prohibitive. A straightforward
application of OTS to signing a full hash of an emergency message would require 256×256×2 = 128K
bits of public key, or 16KB. It is easy to see that the public key can only be used once if we want the
security of hash pre-image to work for every bit of a signed message. Even if using the large key once
were acceptable (think of a catastrophic circumstances that do not present themselves often), the
size of the signature would still be half as large: 8KB, which would take some time to communicate
3Our design constraint 1, Post Quantum, eliminates the use of standard public-key cryptography, which would
provide an effective signature provided the originator’s public key is validated in advance by blockchain
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over a low bit-rate channel, especially in the presence of transmission errors necessitating a re-
transmission. We wish to keep to compact messages, 200 bytes or less if we can, as all other
messages we use are similarly short.
6.2 Public key
Let us start with the public key problem. We propose to bring the SLVP protocol messages to bear
on the emergency mode to eliminate transmission and authentication of the public key. Recall that
a thing running the protocol sends messages that depend on nonces Nk which are chosen by it at
random, see figure 3. At the validation step, the FS computes Nˆk = Lk ⊕ Pk+1 and verifies that
Nˆk = Nk by applying H(·) to both sides and checking the equality.
We propose that every thing engaging in SLVP must compute random nonces Nk by building a
hash chain:
Nk = N
[α]
k
N
[i]
k = H(N
[i−1]
k ) where i = 1, . . . , α ,
and where N
[0]
k is completely random and is kept secret by the thing for at least α rounds of the
protocol.
In other words, every nonce is an image of a random number under α applications of H(·). When
the server has posted the value Pk it received from the thing, it has access to, and has verified,
N
[α]
i for all i = 0, . . . , k − 1
For a given UID, the public key for signature verification for the period between the postings of Pk
and Pk+1 is as follows:
{N [α−i]k−i } for i = 1, . . . , α− 1 .
If Lamport’s OTS is used, the thing supplies for some i the value N
[α−i−1]
k−i , which the server, which
has no access to any N j with j < α, can verify by applying H(·) to it i + 1 times and comparing
the result with N
[α]
k−i = Nk−i it has at its disposal from previous rounds of SLVP for the same UID.
Notice that as k advances to k + 1 with a new round of SLVP the same chain Nk−i is used for
public key with an earlier pre-image:
N
[α−i]
k−i → N [α−(i+1)](k+1)−(i+1)
until the protocol is α rounds ahead of the chain at which point the chain will have been fully used
and no longer required for OTS purposes. We conclude that the public key is unique to each round
of SLVP and that the “private key”, i.e. set of potential pre-images is unknown to the FS in that
round.
This arrangement of chains and pre-images makes it possible not to share any further public key,
with the savings in communication and authentication via SLVP signatures. It is quite useful for
the IoT world, and the price that we pay is the need to pre-hash a random string α times at every
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round of the SLVP protocol. Taking a popular ESP32 system-on-cheap as a specific example we
learn from [8] that it takes ∼ 1µs at full power to process one AES256 hash block, perhaps 0.1ms for
α = 100. The energy spent is a fraction of LoRa communication cost for the same. It is completely
justified if the thing potentially requires emergency communications in this or any of the future α
rounds, assuming that it is sufficient to sign a certain number of bits L of the emergency message
(or its digest) to reassure the responder of nonrepudiation. For Lamport’s classical OTS signature,
L = α/2. We will improve on this next.
6.3 GF-HORS
The excessive size of OTS signatures have been recognised by many authors, and several proposal
have been made to improve on this. We will follow methodology presented in [15], where an original
idea, Hash to Obtain Random Subset (HORS), was first put forward.
Assume that α is a power of 2. Compute a length-L digest of the message we wish to sign and
partition its binary representation into slices log2 α bits long. Interpret these slices as unsigned
numbers
σj , j = 0, . . . ,
L
log2 α
− 1 .
where all σj < α. Now for each j the thing supplies the value N
[α−σj−1]
k−σj to form a signature. The
FS validates the signature by recomputing the digest of the message, then recomputing {σj} from
the digest, and then for each j verifying N
[α−σj−1]
k−σj by applying H(·) to it σj +1 times and checking
that the result equals the previously obtained nonce Nk−σj .
The idea to use the digest of the message to be signed rather than the actual bits of it by partitioning
the string was first proposed in [15], and the security of this method is slightly less than that of
the second pre-image hardness, since here the attacker only needs to find a message whose digest
partitioned into suitable chunks gives the same set or even a subset of {σj} in any order. However,
the authors of [15] remark that finding a (useful) message that has the same set or a subset of digest
chunks as a given one is still computationally hard for a good digest.
We propose a GF-HORS signature (HORS signature with SLVP-derived public key) based on a
keyed MAC with the shared key K as the digest. The MAC protects the message being signed from
an outside forgery, and the HORS signature protects it from an insider job. Let us take a look at
some example numbers to illustrate the efficiency of the scheme.
If we assume α = 64 and use AES-128 for the digest MAC (shortening it down to 126), we get
up to 21 sigmas. Assuming for estimation purposes that the digest is a random bit string, the
probability that an attacker’s digest gives a subset of the sigmas, is less than (21/64)21, around
10−10, a pretty good result for an IoT device nonrepudiation. The communication cost of the
signature is 256 × 21/8 = 672 bytes, about three messages on LoRa. Recall that we require three
shorter messages (around 128 bytes all in total) for an SLVP round, which is in the same order of
magnitude.
A final remark. When a thing is first enrolled by the server, there is not enough nonces in its
history (in fact there aren’t any initially) for the formation of the public key. One remedy could be
to produce α nonce chains at enrolment and share α chain-ends with the FS at that point. Another
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solution is to consider the first α SLVP rounds of a new thing a probationary period, when it is
being tested and adapted to its environment and when it is not allowed to participate in emergency
communications.
7 Related work
The advantages of blockchain technology in the case of IoT are not clearly articulated in literature.
Recent surveys [10],[16] recognise blockchain as a disruptive technology for the IoT, and list the
benefits in generic terms:
• Decentralisation: Distributed Ledger Technology is supposed to be more robust and secure
against a single point of failure.
• Pseudonymity: the ability to enrol a new actor by registering its public key (or public hash,
in our case)
• Security of Transactions. This boils down to the immutability of the ledger.
This is matched with a plethora of use cases mentioned in [10], see pp. 212-214. However, none of
the bullet points is specific for the IoT.
We find our objectives to be close to those of [7], and that paper is a good illustration of how
different our approach is from the direction inspired by typical assumptions. The authors of [7]
assume, like others (see, for example, [6]), that an individual IoT device is likely to be underpowered
for managing blockchain transactions directly, as it does not have the storage space, communication
bandwidth or processing power for such a task.
As far as communications are concerned, article [7] correctly posits that low bit-rate formats, such
as LoRa will be used. However it pays to differentiate between communication of a small amount
of security-related data and unsecured, bulk public data transfer.
Storage-wise, to the best of our knowledge published research assumes that the blockchain either
has to be stored at the IoT device itself (which is indeed expensive), or trust must exist between
the device and any storage server (as well as a sufficiently high communication bandwidth). The
latter assumption is not necessarily justified due to the availability of Content-Addressable Storage
(CAS), which is, by construction, self-certified not requiring trust or secure communications. The
idea of CAS goes back to the late 1990’s paper [5] where it was proposed to use a file’s CRC as
its name, which is not quite satisfactory due to massive aliasing, but a few years later paper [14]
suggested the cryptographic hashes of files should serve as file names. In the last five years the
leading general-purpose CAS project has been one known as InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) [3]
and it is widely used.
The original Guy-Fawkes protocol on which PLS is based ([2], p.12) requires four items to be
published in every round of the protocol, while PLS only publishes three. Also, verification in a
round of Guy Fawkes requires a calculation that involves three items to be hashed together, whereas
PLS computes a hash of one item of a minimum size, a factor of three saving on the receive side.
PLS performs a symmetric decryption to obtain and confirm the message (or, to be precise, the
message hash), which Guy Fawkes does not have to do. However, taking an example of ESP32 [8]
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as a popular system-on-chip for IoT with a crypto accelerator, the AES-256 decryption calculation
costs at most 22 clock cycles, while computing SHA-256 requires at least 60 clock cycles to process
one block plus a minimum of 8 cycles to produce the digest. This means that a hash is at least three
times as expensive as the standard encryption. This is to do with the nature of the algorithms (a
much smaller number of rounds for encryption compared to hashing), and it is likely that a hash is
several times slower than a symmetric encryption on other architectures as well.
We conclude that PLS is both faster and less communication-intensive on the receiver end. On the
transmitter end performance matters little, since the FS and Sequencer are not on a tight energy
budget.
We are aware of one prior attempt at building a blockchain based on a GF protocol: [4]. In that
paper the blockchain itself is assumed to be Bitcoin and a GF protocol is used only for signing
value transfer messages (i.e. transactions). The authors of [4] were aware of the jam-spoof attack
(which they call race-condition theft), but their solution is partial, based on a time-out whereas the
V -messages in our SLVP protocol capture both pre-images, the current and the next ones, defeating
the jam-spoof attack without a time-out facility (but we still require the “earlier LV message wins”
analysis similar to [4]).
Conclusions
We have presented the architecture and protocol suite for a permissioned blockchain construction
based on the Guy Fawkes family of protocols. We have limited trust to one sealed, unupgradable unit
we call Sequencer which is not internet-connected and which is responsible for keeping a short-term
secret for a short time. The rest of the network is zero-trust. Finally, we have proposed a protocol
for posting signed messages of any size on the blockchain without using public-key cryptography
and discussed its security, optimisations and emergency mode.
The advantages of our proposed method are the following:
1. GF protocols have the convenience of public-key crypto without having to manage keys,
perform costly computations on tiny IoT devices or be vulnerable to quantum attacks.
2. things can validate each other’s transactions without trusting third parties.
3. validation proofs become objects in their own right, stored in the same CAS structure as
all other blockchain records; they can be sent to any blockchain witnesses for re-validation,
saving the IoT device the computation cost at the expense of trust. This makes trust tuneable
to the requirements of a specific application up to and including total lack of trust.
Future work will define mechanisms and protocols for managing trust whereby a thing may delegate
verification of transactions to a blockchain witness. We will also focus on a lightweight smart-
contract language.
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